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A generic conflict model is developed to analyze international toxic waste disposal 
issues, and then, to provide feasible strategic resolutions for this serious environmental 
dispute.  With the rapid growth of the global economy, toxic waste traffic from the 
advanced to developing nations has become a serious side effect of this globalization. The 
illegal transboundary movement of toxic wastes not only aggravates the burden on the 
poorer nations, but also negatively impacts the worldwide environment.  
In this thesis, the ongoing toxic waste disputes are divided into two stages consisting of 
the dumping prevention and dispute resolution stages.  The analyses based on the 
methodology of Graph Model for Conflict Resolution are used in both stages in order to 
grasp the structure and implications of the conflict from a strategic viewpoint.  The 
in-depth modeling of the toxic waste dumping disputes, which consist of historical and 
generic situations, specifies the involved parties and their options.  By synthesizing the 
economic, political and legal factors, the relative preferences for each party can be 
determined.  The Graphical User Interface (GUI) of the Decision Support System (DSS) 
GMCR II simplifies the processing of calculations. The analytical research furnishes   
investigators or other interested parties with possible resolutions for the disputes arising 
from an international waste dumping event.  Sensitivity analyses are also conducted to 
provide a comprehensive understanding of the different situations that may occur in 
real-world cases.  The case study of the Ivory Coast waste dumping controversy is used to 
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 The international dumping of toxic waste in developing countries by developed 
nations has become a serious situation, which has generated significant concerns among 
nations around the globe.  In response to this grave concern, a generic graph model has 
been developed for the modeling and analysis of the resulting international toxic waste 
disposal negotiation problem.  This model provides investigators or other interested 
parties with a framework for formally analyzing disputes arising from an international 
waste dumping event.  Based upon information collected from involved parties, 
possible resolutions are furnished.  Due to the variety of situations that may occur in 
actual cases, sensitivity analyses are also provided.  After a strategic investigation of the 
Ivory Coast Waste Dumping case in August 2006, some conclusions and discussions are 
addressed. 
 
1.1. International Toxic Waste Disposal 
International toxic waste disposal has become a by-product of industrialization and 
globalization. This past century witnessed an increasingly globalized economy.  As 
evidence of this global activity, the World Trade Organization (WTO), successor to the 
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), was established in 1995 (UN 
Integrated Regional Information Networks, 2006).  However, negative side effects, such 
as widespread groundwater and food chain pollutions, have unfortunately been 
generated. 
In the second half of the twentieth century, along with the rapid development of 
technology, the disposal of wastes, especially hazardous wastes, has become a major 
burden for highly advanced countries.  At the same time, people have come to realize 
the importance of living in harmony with their natural environment.  Hence, regulations 
and laws related to environmental protection finally came into effect in these countries 
(Tolba, 1990).  Consequently, the costs of the disposal of hazardous wastes dramatically 
rose along with the corresponding compliance with these laws.  Driven by profits, 
industrialists began to seek lower-cost ways to dispose of toxic wastes.  
Obviously, weakly governed developing countries gradually became the most 
popular targets for toxic waste dumping and the least costly alternative to solving the 
toxic waste problem.  Sadly, numerous toxic waste traders transferred huge volumes of 
hazardous wastes from richer nations to poorer ones with a contagion of the NIMBY 
(not-in-my-backyard) syndrome (Asante-Duah, 1998).  Consequently, the 
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes escalated beyond control throughout the 
1980s (Secretariat of the Basel Convention, 2006).  
As a number of scandals and tragedies began to reveal the scope of this problem, 
people eventually woke up to the situation, and endeavored to find practical solutions to 
prevent the continuation of this outrage against the environment. After 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) campaigned against this illegal trafficking, the 
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United Nations (UN) authorized its United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to 
take practical action. In March of 1989, 118 countries signed the Basel Convention on 
the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste and their Disposal, which 
went into force in May, 1992.  As of July, 1997, 113 countries had ratified the treaty 
(Secretariat of the Basel Convention, 2006).  The Basel Convention drew up the 
principles of environmentally sound and efficient management, in order to achieve the 
final goal of protecting human health and the environment from hazardous wastes 
(United Nations Environment Programme, 2002).  It not only established a legislative 
mechanism to control the transportation of international hazardous wastes, but also 
furnished detailed and practical provisions in managing the transboundary movement 
between the parties of the Convention.  To facilitate the implementation of the 
Convention, parties are required to designate competent authorities who will provide 
prior written notification for any hazardous waste movement.  Furthermore, the 
Convention requires the nation of export, or generator, or exporter to provide prior 
written notification to the competent authority of the nation of import.  All export may 
only take place with the prior written consent from the nation of import and transit 
(Secretariat of the Basel Convention, 2006).  The Basel Convention is not only a 
milestone in international environmental law, but also a significant breakthrough against 
illegal trafficking in hazardous wastes. 
Nevertheless, as a voluntary agreement, the Basel Convention applies only to those 
parties who signed the treaty and, therefore, remains unheeded by those countries that 
rejected it.  Unfortunately, some heavily industrialized countries, such as the United 
States, refused to sign the Basel Convention (Secretariat of the Basel Convention, 2006).  
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In addition to this limited jurisdiction, the treaty has an inherently weak control 
mechanism due to the principle of “Prior Informed Consent”, which has led to numerous 
“legal” transboundary movements of hazardous wastes that are labeled as having 
“Competent Authority”.  Moreover, the particular political structure of the UN means 
the inevitable overlap of the jurisdictional solutions between the Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements (MEA) and the Free Trade Agreements (FTA).  This 
complexity has diminished the strength of international environmental law (Puckett, 
1997). 
 
1.2. Motivation of the Research     
Because of the complex nature of the international toxic waste dumping problem as 
was discussed in the last section, a practical and efficient methodology is required to 
examine and resolve it.  The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) (Fang et al., 
1993) is a novel approach to model and analyze strategic conflict.  As an expansion of 
conflict analysis (Fraser and Hipel, 1984), GMCR provides an easy-to-use and flexible 
methodology for strategic conflict analysis, and differs from the technique of classical 
non-cooperate game theory (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944).  In this thesis, by 
breaking down the toxic waste dumping problems into two main stages, the dispute 
prevention stage and the dispute resolving stage, complicated conflict situations are 
readily investigated, better understanding of past events realized, and possible outcomes 
for ongoing conflicts forecast. 
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1.3. Organization of this Thesis 
Figure 1.1 outlines the structure for this thesis.  In the forthcoming chapters three 
series of fundamental questions are discussed to clearly explain the research that is 
presented within the thesis. 
• What is international toxic waste dumping? Who are involved in the dispute? 
Why is it so important to analyze this type of dispute?  The answers for this first series 
of questions are explained in Chapters 2 and 3.  More specifically, Chapter 2 focuses on 
the technical and historical aspects of toxic wastes and the transboundary movements of 
toxic wastes.  Their relationship with the global economy and politics is also stated.  
Chapter 3 analyzes in detail various dispute situations, especially the parties involved and 
their objectives and responsibilities. 
• What is the methodology used in this thesis? What is the basic idea of this 
methodology? Is it an appropriate tool for addressing this toxic waste problem?  
Chapter 4 introduces the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution, where it is used to 
investigate and resolve international toxic waste dumping disputes.  Advantages and 
other important aspects of this methodology are discussed.  A practical decision support 
system, GMCR II, used to apply the methodology to practical problems, is presented at 
the end of the chapter. 
• How is the dispute modeled? How is the analysis carried out? Can this kind of 
analysis be utilized in practice?  In Chapters 5 and 6, the generic multi-stage graph 
model is proposed.  By applying the model to a real world toxic waste dumping case, 






Figure 1.1. Organization of the Thesis 
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 model are illustrated and proven.  




This chapter started with a brief introduction of the international toxic waste disposal 
problem, and highlighted the methodology of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution 
and its realistic significance for investigating this serious type of issue.  Then, the 













The twentieth century was considered a new era of modernization in human 
civilization.  Following World War II, peace and development, instead of colonialism, 
became the mainstream priority throughout the world.  At that time, most countries 
started to concentrate on the building of regimes and the development of their economies, 
which then contributed to the tremendous driving force motivating human civilization to 
move forward.  Along with the development of new technologies, new materials were 
being refined and improved.  Also at this time, new industries were born, such as the 
petrochemical, biochemical, and nuclear industries, and, as well, conventional industries 
were enriched.  Simultaneously, rapid industrial growth and incredible efficiency were 
present in many nations.  However, all things may be viewed from two perspectives.  
The overexploitation of natural resources damaged the environment of the local populace, 
and extensive agricultural and industrial production increased wastes.  It became 
necessary to dispose of various wastes to eliminate the negative side effects of the new 
technologies.  Many of these wastes were toxic, non-recyclable and capable of causing 
permanent contamination and damage to the environment.  Due to these disastrous 
impacts on the environment and the high cost of the disposal of these toxic wastes, many 
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nations transferred this heavy burden to other nations in order to protect their domestic 
environment.  Over the past decade, the international dumping of toxic wastes has 
become even more widespread and as a result, attracted serious critical attention and 
concern. 
 
2.1. What are Toxic Wastes? 
2.1.1. Definitions and Classification  
While entering a new era in human history, to meet the swelling demand caused by 
the booming global population, people were forced to increase production capabilities. 
Numerous new technologies were adopted in the production activities of human beings. 
Although the technological innovations have improved the quality of their lives, people 
have come to rely on technologies and the resulting exploitation of natural resources.  
The extent of this exploitation and the abuse of new technologies have caused an energy 
and environmental crisis.  A tremendous amount of hazardous waste has been produced 
annually.  Figure 2.1 illustrates the amount of hazardous wastes generated from 1993 to 
2000.  
As a multidimensional term, the definition and classification system of hazardous 
wastes is composed of a set of mixed criteria from Chemistry and Environics.  In order 
to avoid any confusion, this research adopts the definition and classification system from 
the Basel Convention, which is used to determine the type of waste (Secretariat of the 




Figure 2.1. Worldwide Generation of Hazardous Wastes  
(Secretariat of the Basel Convention, 2002) 
 
 
• Type I: These wastes, which need to be controlled, consist of the two main 
categories and relevant sub-categories.  The categorization of these types of 
wastes is explained in Table 2.1. 
• Type II: These wastes require special consideration, and consist of wastes and 
residues from common households.  
• Type III: These wastes are defined as hazardous.  Table 2.2 presents a list of 
hazardous wastes and their characteristics.  The wastes that contain one or 
more of the characteristics listed in this table would be considered hazardous.  




Table 2.1. Type I Wastes Categorization 
Category I 
1) Clinical usage.
2) The production and formulation of pharmaceutical, biocides, and organic 
solvents. 
3) Chemical substances containing polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), 
polychlorinated terphenyls (PCTs), and/or polybrominated biphenyls (PBBs). 
Category II 
1) The heavy metal elements and compounds, such as: Beryllium, Copper, and 
Zinc. 
2) Organic compounds, such as: Phosphorus, Cyanides, and Phenols. 
 
Table 2.2. List of Hazardous Characteristics 
 (Adapted from Annex III of the Basel Convention) 
UN Class Code Characteristics Description 
1 H1 Explosive Explosive substances
2 H3 Flammable Liquids Liquids with strong volatility
4.1 H4.1 Flammable Solids Solids with strong volatility
4.2 H4.2 Flammable Spontaneous combustible substances 
4.3 H4.3 Flammable Substances with flammability in contact with water
5.1 H5.1 Oxidizing Substances with oxidizability
5.2 H5.2 Organic Peroxides 
Organic unstable substances with exothermic 
self-accelerating decomposition 
6.1 H6.1 Poisonous 
Substances cause death and serious injury through various 
routes of entry 
6.2 H8 Infectious Substances contain pestiferous bacterium, viruses 
8 H10 Corrosives 
Cause severe damage to  living organisms due to contact 
or leakage 
9 H10 Toxic Gas Liberation of toxic gas interaction with air or water.
9 H11 Chronic Toxic Substances with chronic effects on human health 
9 H12 Ecotoxic Exposure to toxic substances leads to bioaccumulation
9 H13 Produce 




2.1.2. Environmental Effects 
Hazardous substances possess the chemical and biochemical characteristics that 
dictate the dangers of these materials.  Hazardous wastes can be roughly further 
classified into the following classes by:  
(1) heavy metal elements;  
(2) flammable substances, whose explosion can be considered as a sort of acute 
combustion;  
(3) poisonous substances; and 
(4) pestiferous substances. 
From physical and chemical perspectives, many substances are synthetic compounds. 
These substances are extremely unstable, and tend to encounter an acute chemical 
interaction or volatilize during storage and transportation.  They may not only damage 
the living organisms within a certain range, but also contaminate the air, soil, and water 
resources.  Correspondingly, other substances exist stably as certain compounds. 
People have opened a Pandora’s Box by decomposing compounds into unstable 
states and distributing these unstable substances and their toxicities into the environment.  
For instance, heavy metal elements are generally poisonous and radioactive.  Due to 
their chemical stability, also called durability, after being abandoned heavy metals can 
exist for years.  They poison species by disrupting their cellular enzymes, which 
maintain the mineral metabolism of living cells.  No matter how heavy metal elements 
enter the body of a species, they will damage normal life activities of the species through 
the bioaccumulation of toxicities.  Moreover, the radioactivity of most heavy metals can 
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cause variations in species.  According to Darwin’s Evolution Theory, there are three 
basic processes required for evolution to take place:  
(1) there must be some way for inheritability to occur;  
(2) there must be variation; and 
(3) there must be a natural selection. 
Variation caused by toxicity may lead evolution in a wrong direction, and therefore, 
disturb the balance of ecosystems.  
 
2.2. Transboundary Movement of Toxic Wastes  
The progress of new technologies manifests itself not only in the applications of 
technologies but also in the changes of people’s consciousness.  With the growth of 
industrialization, people in industrialized countries came to realize the importance of 
environmental protection.  As a prevalent disposal option for waste, landfill was not a 
feasible treatment for most of the hazardous wastes.  People were not willing to risk 
their lives by having dump and landfill sites located where they live.  In many 
industrialized countries, relevant environmental laws and regulations successively came 
into being.  For instances, in 1969, the United States (US) launched the National 
Environmental Act and founded the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  The 
United Kingdom’s (UK) Deposit of Poistionous Waste Act (DPWA) was implemented in 
1972 (Asante-Duah, 1998).  Highly industrialized countries established more advanced 
technological and industrial standards than less-industrialized nations, such as controls 
over utilization rates of resources, emission standards and disposal technologies.  
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Contrarily, most poor nations were in a difficult situation with weak governance due to 
historical and other reasons.  Inadequate funds and fragile infrastructure cannot support 
an effective administration or law enforcement system.  Therefore, industrialized 
countries legislated more strict environmental protection than poorer countries.  The 
difference of environmental laws between rich and poor countries became one of the 
main reasons for the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes.  Just like water 
stream’s flow from higher ground to lower, hazardous wastes move from nations with 
more restrictive environmental laws to others with less restrictive environmental laws.  
Typically, the existed movement characterized two main directions of flows: from North 
to South and West to East. It was disclosed in 1988 that more than 1 million tonnes 
hazardous wastes were transported from West Europe to East Germany. These exporters 
included Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK and West 
Germany.  Similar routes of hazardous wastes were also observed in the North America. 
As the neighbors of the US, most Latin American and Caribbean Countries readily 
became the recipients of the US hazardous wastes (Asante-Duah and Nagy, 1998). 
However, the actual situation always becomes more complex when economical and 
political factors are considered, and thus, can never be viewed as the simple flow of a 
water stream.  After it began in the 1970s, the transboundary movement of hazardous 
wastes dramatically increased throughout the following decades.  Table 2.3 provides the 
number of schemes proposed for exports by receiving region and year.  
This table shows the increasing tendency to import wastes into developing or 
less-industrialized regions.  This data also illustrates the irregular development of these 
imports.  Particularly of note is the increase from 1989 to 1990 suggesting a lack to the 
15 
response to the Basel Convention, but the remarkable decrease from 1992 to 1993 does 
reflect its influence after fully coming into force in 1992. 
 
Table 2.3.  Number of Schemes Proposed for Exports by Receiving Region and Year 
 (Clapp, 2001) 
 Year
Totals  Region 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Baltics and Eastern/Central Europe 32 50 43 113 61 299
Africa 11 4 4 7 4 30
Pacific  1 4 1 2 4 12
East Asia 4 14 22 50 22 112
Southeast Asia 0 2 10 46 26 84
South Asia 2 3 2 24 12 43
Middle East 0 0 1 12 1 14
Latin America/Caribbean 27 42 30 32 16 148
Totals  77 120 113 286 146 742
 
 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (1993b) 
estimated that “on average, a consignment of hazardous wastes crossed an OECD 
frontier every five minutes, 24 hours per day, and 365 days per year”. Montgomery 
(1995) also stated that “officially, about 1 million tonnes, or 5-10 percent of hazardous 
wastes produced by the rich countries are legally traded”. Actually, the reliability and 
consistency of data were extremely difficult to maintain in practice.  For example, in the 
OECD countries, which possess the most advanced environmental management systems, 
success was only achieved in dealing with this problem on a domestic level (O’Neil, 
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2000).  Although the records of tracing these movements were not reliably complete, 
they still revealed the rapidly increasing tendency that the hazardous wastes were flowing 
from developed to developing countries, as shown in Table 2.4.  
 
 
Table 2.4. Number of Waste Trade Schemes from OECD to Non-OECD Nations 
















1989 54 17 71 5 76 76% 
1990 92 19 111 7 118 83% 
1991 94 14 108 5 113 87% 
1992 238 30 268 17 285 88% 
1993 123 15 138 8 146 89% 
Totals 601 95 696 42 738 86% 
 
 
The United States, the largest hazardous waste generator, annually produces 80 
percent of the world’s hazardous wastes (Clapp, 2001).  Figure 2.2 illustrates the rapid 
growth trend in the quantities of hazardous waste generation in the United States between 
1970 and 1989.  
This data may seem of little importance, but numerous highly notorious scandals 
have been exposed.  For example, in December of 1987, a cargo ship dumped about 
4,000 tons of ash, from a Philadelphia garbage incinerator labeled “soil fertilizer”, near 
Gonaives, Haiti (Pellow, 2007).  In addition, in 1988, a boatload of toxic Italian 




Figure 2.2. Trend in the Quantities of Hazardous Wastes Generation in the United States 
between 1970 and 1989 (adapted from Asante-Duah and Nagy, 1998) 
 
 
Having experienced a period of disorder regarding the movement of international 
hazardous wastes, people had to recognize and respond to the serious consequences 
caused by this uncontrolled waste traffic.  Many nations successfully established 
national level systems for controlling and monitoring the transboundary movement of 
hazardous wastes.  These attempts finally propelled the adoptions of a series of 
multilateral agreements and international conventions.  The Basel Convention of 1989, 
as a milestone in the history of international environmental law, established a legislative 
mechanism to control and prohibit the illegal international traffic of hazardous wastes.  
Details about the Basel Convention are further discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
18 
2.3. Relationships with the Global Economy and Politics 
2.3.1. Establishment of the global waste trade market  
In the last century, human civilization experienced the ravages of two world wars, 
which caused the global economy to recede.  People were dedicated themselves to the 
recovery and redevelopment of the economy following the two world wars.  These 
efforts brought a post war economic boom that resulted in industrial growth and an 
increase in generation of toxic wastes.  Related environmental laws were enacted to 
protect public health, and required a compulsory treatment on hazardous wastes, which 
increased disposal costs.  Because countries have different capabilities to treat toxic 
wastes, trader in toxic wastes took place among countries. The Netherlands, for example, 
was one of the first nations to trade in toxic wastes starting in 1969 (Asante-Duah and 
Nagy 1998).   
2.3.2. Hazardous Waste Movement and the Global Economy 
After a new international regime was established following the end of the Cold War, 
the global economy entered an era of renaissance.  The establishment of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 was a significant landmark in the expansion of the 
global economy.  The WTO’s fundamental principles originated by GATT, which 
included: 1) freer trade, which minimizes the trade barriers to ensure the flow of 
commodities, and encourage trade, and, 2) non-discriminatory trade, which contains two 
aspects described as follows (World Trade Organization Information and Media 
Relations Division, 2007). 
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• Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN): treating other people equally.  As a member of 
this trade system, countries cannot discriminate between their trading partners, and any 
state has to do the same for all other members. 
• National Treatment: treating foreigners and locals equally. Products from 
importation and local manufacturers should be treated equally — at least after the foreign 
goods have entered the market. 
These positive aspects of the Free Trade system contributed substantially to the 
development of the global economy.  However, also due to the free trade market, 
hazardous wastes became a type of commodity.  If the assumption of ignoring the 
environmental influence of hazardous wastes could be made, hazardous wastes trade 
could be considered as an extremely profitable business having a world wide market and 
beneficial to the global economy in a certain sense.  For example, in the United States, 
the cost of landfill for hazardous wastes increased from US $15 per ton in 1980 to US 
$250 per ton in 1988 (Stronhm, 1993; Clapp, 2001).  At the same time, in Africa, the 
cost was about US $40, or in some cases, as low as US $2.5 (Tolba, 1990; Clapp, 2001).  
Therefore, when the United States exported hazardous wastes, the cost of waste disposal 
would become substantially lower.  Not only the waste exporter, but also the receiver 
would make profits.  It seemed to be a win-win situation.  However, this specific 
assumption has questionable validity because the negative environmental influences are 
so significant that they can never be neglected.  To analyze the global economy, people 
must consider the significant impact of the environmental factors.  Although impacts 
may not appear instantly, they will surface in the long term. 
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2.3.3. Hazardous Waste Movement and Global Politics 
  Hazardous waste movement reflects the bilateral and multilateral relation of the 
involved parties and reveals the contrast of the political strengths of nations.  On one 
side, the rich nations not only dominate at the international political stage because of 
their outstanding economic, military and cultural factors, but also continue to enlarge 
their advantages by using all feasible methods.  Transferring the heavy burden by 
dumping hazardous wastes to the poor nations is one of them.  On the other hand, with 
the awakening of the developing countries, they united and struggled together for more 
advantageous positions in international relations.  Nevertheless, globalization requires 
the formation of interdependencies between these two groups, which also has political 
implications (Schwenninger, 2003).  In addition, with the mediation of the UN and 
participation of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in international affairs, a new 
type of multi-polarity has emerged in international politics (Wendt, 1993).  
 
2.4. Impact on the Global Environment 
Figure 2.3 demonstrates the known and suspected routes of international hazardous 
wastes trade.  Hazardous wastes mainly travel from the most advanced countries, such 
as the US and the European Union (EU), to the less developed countries, like nations in 
Africa, Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe.  
Hazardous waste traffic crosses oceans and continents, to every developing nation 
location.  The combination of long transport distances and the great volume of 
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transported hazardous waste results in large amounts of energy consumption and the 
emission of huge quantities of carbon dioxide and toxic gases, which, in turn, accelerate 
global warming.  As well, the transportation routes cross oceans and continents, and are 
not secure due to geographical and climatic conditions.  Accidents or leakage during 
transportation cause potentially catastrophic damage to the surrounding environment.  
 
Figure 2.3. Known and Suspect Routes of Hazardous Waste Traffics 
 
The movement of hazardous wastes is actually redistributing their geographical 
locations.  This redistribution only serves to decrease the environmental contamination 
in the exporting countries.  Globally, there is no elimination of hazardous waste, but in 
reality the production of more unnecessary wastes.  Furthermore, lacking complete 
management systems and current disposal technologies for hazardous wastes, developing 
countries only adopt simple solutions, such as landfill and incineration, which result in 
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the hazardous substances inevitably contaminating the surrounding environment and 
spreading to other locations.  Finally, if the activity of international waste dumping 
continues, the harm of hazardous wastes will react with the international environment 
through the global ecosystem. 
  
2.5. Conflicts Caused by International Toxic Waste 
Disposal   
Conflicts arise when interactions between antithetical forces become acute. The 
nations of export, import and transit interacted in the case of the international toxic waste 
disposal. Conflicts occurred because of these interactions.  Chapter 4 of this thesis 
develops a generic multi-stage graph model to investigate the conflicts caused by 
international toxic waste disposal disputes.  The detailed descriptions of the participants 
are also provided with applications. 
 
2.6. Summary 
 This chapter begins with the introduction to the definition and classification system 
of hazardous wastes, and describes the chemical and physical characteristics of 
hazardous substances and their dangers.  The history of hazardous waste dumping is 
then traced and the reason for its occurrence explored.  Finally, economic and political 
perspectives provide further understanding of the conflicts caused by international waste 
dumping. 
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The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) is a game theoretic methodology 
that can be used to analyze situations of disharmony existing everywhere in the real 
world (Fang et al., 1993).  As an expansion of the metagame (Howard, 1971) and 
conflict analysis (Fraser and Hipel, 1984), GMCR provides investigators and researchers 
with an easy-to-use and flexible methodology for strategic conflict analysis (Fang et al., 
1993).  The Decision Support System (DSS) GMCR II is embodied with the core 
GMCR analysis engine and the friendly Graphical User Interface (GUI).  The GMCR II 
assists users in all phases of modeling, analyzing and interpreting of strategic conflicts 
(Fang et al., 2003a, 2003b).  
 
3.1. Decision Making under Conflict 
As the only intelligent species on the earth, humans possess unique characteristics, 
which differentiate them from all other species.  The human concept of self-awareness, 
their thought processes, and other distinct psychological characteristics over time, 
resulted in the birth of civilization and human society.  The combination of the human 
social and competitive natures resulted in the development of religions, ethnicities, 
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differentiation and corresponding conflicts, which have prevailed throughout the history 
of civilized man. 
Conflicts arise when the interactions between antithetical parties become acute. 
Generally, every involved party endeavours to maximize what he/she may gain in a 
conflict situation.  This is a difficult challenge for all parties, deciding upon the options, 
which most benefit them.  As a rational participant in the conflict, each party must 
analyze the situation, predict their rivals’ possible preferred solutions and then prepare 
his/her own solution.  Obviously, an intelligent and efficient method becomes vital to 




Figure 3.1. The General Conflict Analysis Process (adapted from Hipel, 2007) 
 
 Figure 3.1 illustrates a general conflict analysis process: starting with modeling the 
conflict, the redundant information is filtered and a complicated situation is transformed 
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into a precise mathematical model.  Then, after conducting a stability analysis the 
resulting information is outputted to the involved parties for Decision Making.  
Numerous models have been developed to improve the conflict analysis methodology.  
These diverse models and perspectives have enhanced techniques and enlarged the scope 
of conflict analysis.  Therefore, conflict analysis may be applied in situations ranging 
from strategic to tactical, unstructured to highly structured, qualitative to quantitative, 




Figure 3.2. Engineering Decision Making (adapted from Hipel, 2007) 
 
26 
The conflict model is a non-quantitative approach to Game Theory.  Classical 
publications of Game Theory include Von Neumann (1928), Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1944), and Nash (1950).  Figure 3.3 depicts the genealogy of formal 
conflict analysis models: Game Theory is constituted of a non-quantitative approach and 
a quantitative procedure.  Non-quantitative analyses are based upon an assumption of 
relative preference information where one object is preferred equally or more than 
another.  A Decision Maker (DM) does not have to know the exact quantity of 
distinction.  Conversely, the quantitative analyses assume cardinal preference 




Figure 3.3. Genealogy of Formal Conflict Models (adapted from Hipel and Obeidi, 2005) 
27 
Based upon the traditional Game Theory approach, Howard (1971) introduced a 
non-quantitative model, called metagame analysis.  Successively, Fraser and Hipel 
(1984) developed the Conflict Analysis model (Frasel and Hipel, 1984).  The Graph 
Model for Conflict Resolution is a further improvement of metagame analysis (Fang et 
al., 1993).  Both the metagame analysis and GMCR are generally applied to social 
conflicts because of their inherent non-quantitative nature (Hipel and Obeidi, 2005).  
Details of the GMCR are discussed in the next few sections. 
 
3.2. The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution 
The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution is a systematic approach that handles 
complicated strategic decision problems involving two or more DMs with differing 
preferences (Kilgour et al., 1987; Fang et al., 1993).  With this model, interested parties 
“analyze a conflict and obtain a better understanding about what is currently happening 
and what could eventually take place” (Fang et al., 1993).  
 
3.2.1. General Procedure 
Figure 3.4 depicts the general procedure for practically applying GMCR to a real 
conflict situation.  Within the modeling stage, the complicated conflict is transformed 
into a mathematical model by defining; the involved DMs, their corresponding actions or 
options, possible states or alternatives, and preferences reflecting their interests and 
objectives.  Sequentially, the problem is investigated from the individual stabilities to 
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overall equilibria, and then through, interpretation and sensitivity analyses.  Finally, the 
obtained information is forwarded to DMs, and assists them to make decisions.  Similar 
to the general conflict analysis process, the analysis procedure of GMCR contains 
feedback, which keeps the analytical model interacting with the actual situations.  
Additionally, the model also allows DMs, or interested parties, to retrieve a certain 
analysis stage based upon any insights received from the feedback. 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Two Stages of GMCR (adapted from Fang et al., 1993) 
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3.2.2. Modeling  
GMCR focuses on strategic level conflict analysis with a structure of four 
components (Fang et al., 1993; Li et al., 2004a; Kilgour and Hipel, 2005):  
1) a set of DMs { }1,2,...,N n= ; 
2) a set of feasible states { }1 2, ,..., mS s s s= ;  
3) a set of preference relationships among the states { },iP P i N= ∈ , where iP  
denotes the preferences for DM i, which is typically expressed as pair of  binary 
relations, { },∼ on S, respectively, representing strict preference and indifference.  In 
other words, 1s  i  2s  denotes that DM i prefers 1s  to 2s , and 1s  i∼  2s  represents 
that DM i is indifferent between 1s  and 2s , where 1 2,s s S∈ .  More specifically, the 
operator i  is asymmetric (i.e., 1 2s s and 2 1s s  cannot be both true); and the 
operator i∼  is reflexive and symmetric (i.e., if s S∈ , then is s∼  for any s S∈ ; and if 
1 2is s∼ , then 2 1is s∼ ). 
4) a set of directed graphs { },iG i N∈ , where iG  indicates the possible moves 
among the states controlled by DM i .  
In GMCR, a term called Unilateral Movement (UM) is defined as a movement that 
may only be completed in one-step.  If, from a state s, a player i can move unilaterally 
to another state 's , state 's  is considered to be in the reachable list of state s.  Let iR (s) 
denotes player i’s reachable list from state s, then 
( ) ( ){ }' : , 'i iR s s S s s A= ∈ ∈ . 
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 Moreover, after introducing preferences, a certain player may only be willing to 
unilaterally move from a less preferred state to a more preferred one.  The list that 
contains this information is called the Unilateral Improvement (UI) list.  In terms of the 
reachable list, player i’s unilateral improvement list from state s, denoted by ( )iR s
+ , can 
be defined as: 
( ) { ' ( ) : ' }i i iR s s R s s s
+ = ∈  
 
3.2.3. Solution Concepts 
In GMCR, several specific solution concepts, also called stability definitions, are 
used to define stability.  These solution concepts describe DMs’ possible behavioral 
patterns in conflicts.  A state is stable for a DM when he/she has no incentive to move 
away from the state unilaterally.  When a state is stable for all DMs under a certain 
solution concept, it is said to be an equilibrium and represents a potential resolution for 
this conflict.  Six main stability definitions were embodied in GMCR, including: Nash 
Stability (Nash) (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944, 1953; Nash, 1950, 1951), 
General Metarationality (GMR) (Howard, 1971), Symmetric Metarationality (SMR) 
(Howard, 1971), Sequential Stability (SEQ) (Fraser and Hipel, 1979, 1984), Limited 
Move Stability ( hL ) (Kilgour, 1985; Kilgour et al., 1987; Zagare, 1984), and 
Non-Myopic Stability (NM) (Brams and Wittman, 1981; Kilgour, 1984, 1985; Kilgour et 
al., 1987).  
For conflicts with two DMs, denote { , }N i j=  and two DMs as DM i and DM j. 
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Moreover, define 1 2s s  iff 1 2s s  or 1 2s s∼ .The following solution concepts can be 
defined (Li et al., 2004a; Hamouda et al., 2004). 
Definition 3.1.  Let i N∈ , a state s S∈  is Nash Stable (or individual rational) (R) 
for DM i, denoted by Nashis S∈ , iff ( )iR s
+ = ∅ . 
Definition 3.2. Let i N∈ , a state s S∈  is General Metarational (GMR) for DM 
i, denoted by GMRis S∈ , iff for every ( )1 is R s+∈ , there exists at least one ( )2 1js R s∈  
with 2is s . 
Definition 3.3. Let i N∈ , a state s S∈  is Symmetric Metarational (SMR) for DM i, 
denoted by SMRis S∈ , iff for every ( )1 is R s+∈ , there exists at least one ( )2 1js R s∈ , 
such that 2is s  and 3is s  for all ( )3 2is R s∈ . 
Definition 3.4. Let i N∈ , a state s S∈  is Sequential Stable (SEQ) for DM i , 
denoted by SEQis S∈ , iff for every ( )1 is R s+∈ , there exists ( )2 1js R s+∈  with 2is s . 
The 2-DM definitions can be extended to general n-DM (n>2) models with the 
introduction of the concepts of Unilateral Movements and Unilateral Improvements by a 
group of DMs. 
For conflicts with n DMs, let ( )M N M⊆ ≠∅  be a subset of all DMs, and s S∈ . 
Denote ( )MR s  as the set of all states that can be reached through any legal sequence of 
UMs from state s by some or all DMs in M.  If 1 ( )Ms R s∈ , let 1( , )M s sΩ  be the set of 
all last DMs in legal sequences from s to 1s  (Li et al., 2004a; Hamouda et al., 2004). 
 Definition 3.5. Let s S∈  and ( )M N M⊆ ≠∅ .  A UM from state s by M, a 
member of ( )MR s S⊆ , is defined inductively by: 
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(i) if i M∈ and 1 ( )is R s∈ , then 1 ( )Ms R s∈  and 1( , )Mi s s∈Ω . 
(ii) if 1 ( )Ms R s∈ , j M∈  and 2 1( )js R s∈ , then 
(a) if 1| ( , ) |M s sΩ =1 and 1( , )Mj s s∉Ω , then 2 ( )Ms R s∈  and 2( , )Mj s s∈Ω ; 
(b) if 1| ( , ) |M s sΩ >1, then 2 ( )Ms R s∈  and 2( , )Mj s s∈Ω . 
 ( )MR s  is constructed by   
(i) adding states that are UMs from state s by all DMs in M, and  
(ii) adding states that can be reached by sequences of joint moves by some or all 
DMs in M. 
Similarly, the relevant definitions of UIs by a group of DMs can be presented. Let 
( )M N M⊆ ≠∅  be a subset of all DMs, and s S∈ .  Denote ( )MR s
+  as the set of all 
states that can be reached through any legal sequence of UIs from state s by some or all 
DMs in M.  If 1 ( )Ms R s
+∈ , let 1( , )M s s
+Ω  be the set of all last DMs in legal sequences 
from s to 1s  (Li et al., 2004a; Hamouda et al., 2004). 
 Definition 3.6. Let s S∈  and ( )M N M⊆ ≠∅ .  A UI from state s by M, a member 
of ( )MR s S
+ ⊆ , is defined inductively by: 
(i) if i M∈ and 1 ( )is R s
+∈ ,then 1 ( )Ms R s
+∈  and 1( , )Mi s s
+∈Ω . 
(ii) if 1 ( )Ms R s
+∈ , j M∈  and 2 1( )js R s
+∈ ,then  
(a) if 1| ( , ) |M s s
+Ω =1 and 1( , )Mj s s
+∉Ω , then 2 ( )Ms R s
+∈  and 2( , )Mj s s
+∈Ω ; 
(b) if 1| ( , ) |M s s
+Ω >1, then 2 ( )Ms R s
+∈  and 2( , )Mj s s
+∈Ω  
( )MR s
+  is constructed by: 
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(i) adding states that are UIs from state s by all DMs in M, and 
(ii) adding states that can be reached by sequences of joint Unileral 
Improvements by some or all DMs in M. 
The sets ( )N iR s−  and ( )N iR s
+
−  represent the responses or credible sanctions by DM i’s 
rivals against i.  
Hence, stability definitions for Nash, GMR, SMR and SEQ can be defined for n-DM 
models. 
Definition 3.7. Let i N∈ , a state s S∈ is Nash Stable for DM i, denoted by 
Nash
is S∈ ,iff ( )iR s
+ = ∅  
Definition 3.8. Let i N∈ , a state s S∈ is General Metarational for DM i, denoted 
by GMRis S∈ ,iff for every 1 ( )is R s
+∈ ,there exists at lease one 2 1( )N is R s−∈ ,such that 
2is s . 
Definition 3.9. Let i N∈ , a state s S∈  is Symmetric Metarational for DM i, 
denoted by SMRis S∈ ,iff for every 1 ( )is R s
+∈ ,there exists at lease one 2 1( )N is R s−∈ ,such 
that 2is s and 3is s , for all 3 2( )is R s∈ . 
Definition 3.10. Let i N∈ , a state s S∈ is Sequentially Stable for DM i, denoted by 
SEQ
is S∈ ,iff for every 1 ( )is R s
+∈ ,there exists at lease one 2 1( )N is R s
+
−∈ ,such that 2is s . 
Four important behavioral characteristics are listed in Table 3.1.  As an important 
feature, foresight refers to a DM’s capacity of foreseeing possible future moves under a 
particular stability definition. As shown in Table 3.1, Nash stability has the lowest 
foresight, while Non-myopic stability has the highest. To obtain Nash, GMR, or SMR, 
DMs may only need knowledge of their own preferences, while knowledge of all 
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preferences is required to assess other three stability definitions. The strategic 
disimporvement in the next column means a DM may move to a less preferred state 
temporarily in order to reach a more preferred one eventually.  The disimporvement by 
opponents means that other DMs may choose to move to a less preferred state in order to 
block the focal DM’s unilateral improvements.  The column of Strategic Risk contains 
the information of DMs’ different attitudes towards risks, which may affect their 
decisions.  More details may be found in Fang et al. (1993, 2003b) and Kilgour and 
Hipel (2005).  
 
Table 3.1.  The Behavioral Characteristics of Solution Concepts  






Disimprovement Strategic Risk 
Nash stability (R) Low Own Never Ignores risk
General metarationality (GMR) Medium Own By opponents 
Avoids risk; 
Conservative Symmetric metarationality 
(SMR) 
Medium Own By opponents 
Sequential stability (SEQ) Medium All Never 
Takes some
risks; satisfies 
Limited-move stability ( hL ) Variable All Strategic Accepts risk; 
Strategizes Non-myopic stability (NM) High All Strategic
 
3.2.4. Follow-up Analyses 
Sensitivity analysis is one of the most useful procedures in GMCR. Through 
comparison of the stability resolutions by meaningfully modifying model parameters, 
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sensitivity analysis provides a tool for users to gain a more comprehensive knowledge of 
the conflict situation. Corresponding to the particular characteristics of the investigated 
problem, the types of sensitivity analysis may vary in the following list: preference 
changes, option modification or expansion, side payments, modification of DMs, human 
behavior consideration, coalitions, entertainment of other modes to bargaining and 
negotiation. 
As stated by Kilgour et al. (2001), “A coalition is a group of at least two, but not all 
of the parties, that coordinate its actions in the interests of all the coalition partners – at 
least in the short term.”  The investigations of coalitions bring more insights into a 
normal conflict analysis and make the application more convenient. 
Being another interesting topic in GMCR, status quo analysis allows users to 
comprehend the trend of conflict problems starting from status quo, passing through 
states based on the DMs’ interactions, and finally, reaching the outcomes or equilibria. 
For details of status quo analysis, please refer to Li et al. (2004b). 
Moreover, many other analysis procedures are developed to supplement the basic 
stability analysis of GMCR, such as hypergame analysis, emotion analysis, attitude 
analysis, uncertainty, preference eliciting, and so on. These procedures assist GMCR to 
achieve its goals. 
 
 3.3. Modeling Attitudes in GMCR 
In the area of social psychology, attitude is defined as “an enduring system of 
positive or negative evaluations, emotional feeling and pro and con action tendencies, 
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with respect to a social object” (Krech et al., 1962).  The concept of attitudes is 
classified into three types: positive, negative and neutral (Taylor, 1970).  Inohara et al. 
(2007) introduced the concept of attitude into GMCR by modifying and expanding the 
original definitions of preferences, special types of moves among states, and related 
solution concepts. The most important definitions related to attitudes in GMCR are 
presented as follows (Inohara et al., 2007). 
Definition 3.11. (Attitudes): For DMs ,i j N∈ , let { },0, NiE = + −  represent the set 
of attitudes of DM i. An element i ie E∈  is called the attitudes of DM i, for which 
( )i ije e=  is the list of attitudes of DM i towards DM j for each j N∈ , where 
{ },0,ije ∈ + − . The ije  is referred to as the attitude of DM i to DM j where the values 
ije = + , 0ije =  and ije = −  indicates that DM i has a positive, neutral and negative 
attitude towards DM j, respectively. 
Table 3.2 shows how attitude information can be illustrated in the matrix form.  The 
entry at row i and column j represents the attitude of DM i to DM j, with a value of + , 0 
or − .  When all attitude values are 0, the given model is a so-called “rational” model. 
When attitudes are taken into account, the given model is “relational”. 
 
Table 3.2. Attitudes in Matrix Form 
DM i J 
i iie  ije  
j jie  jje  
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Essentially, DMs’ preferences are the elements that are mostly impacted by attitudes. 
Definitions 3.6 to 3.12 provide the theoretical descriptions of related preference 
structures. 
Definition 3.12. (Devoting preference (DP)): The devoting preference of DM i N∈  
with respect to DM j N∈  is j , denoted by DPij , such that for ,s t S∈ ,  DP  ijs t  if 
and only if js t . 
Definition 3.13. (Aggressive preference (AP)): The aggressive preference of DM 
i N∈  with respect to DM j N∈  is ( )jNE , denoted by APij , where ( )jNE  is 
defined as follows: for ,s t S∈ , ( )  js NE t  if and only if js t  is not true. That is, 
for  ,s t S∈ ,  AP  ijs t  if and only if ( )  js NE t  (iff jt s  under completeness of 
j ). 
Definition 3.14. (Relational preference) The relational preference ( )RP ije  of DM 















where Iij  denotes that DM i is indifferent with respect to j’s preference and, hence, 
 I  ijs t  means that DM i’s preference between states s and t is not influenced by DM j’s 
preference. 
 Definition 3.15. (Total relational preference (TRP)) The total relational preference of 
DM i N∈  at e is defined as the ordering ( )TRP ie  such that for ,s t S∈ , 
38 
( ) TRP e  is t  if and only if ( ) RP  ijs e t  for all j N∈ . 
 Definition 3.16. (Total relational reply (TRR)) The total relational reply list of DM 
i N∈  at e for state s S∈  is defined as the set ( ) { } ( ){ }|  TRP  i it R s s t e s∈ ∪  
( ) { }    iR s s⊂ ∪ , denoted by ( ) ( )TRR ie s . 
 Definition 3.17. (Total relational reply list of a coalition) The total relational reply 
list of coalition H N⊂  at e for state s S∈  is defined inductively as the set 
( ) ( )TRR He s  that satisfies the next two conditions: 1) if i H∈  and ( ) ( )TRR it e s∈ , 
then ( ) ( )TRR Ht e s∈ , and 2) if i H∈  and ( ) ( )TRR Ht e s∈  and ( ) ( )TRR iu e s∈ , 
then ( ) ( )TRR Hu e s∈ . 
 Definition 3.18. (Relational less preferred or equally preferred states) The symbol 
( ) ( )iR e sφ
=  is an analogue of ( ) { }| is x S s xφ= = ∈ . Hence, ( ) ( )iR e sφ
=  is the set of 
all states which are “relational less or equally preferred” to s by DM i (under attitude e).  
 Similar to the regular graph model analysis, after applying attitude information to the 
DMs’ preference structures, the stability analyses of the given model are ready to be 
carried out.  Corresponding to the solution concepts explained in last section, the 
revised stability definitions, which are called “relational” solution concepts, are furnished 
as follows. 
 Definition 3.19. (Relational Nash stability) For i N∈ , state s S∈  is relational 
Nash stable at e for DM i, denoted by ( )RNash eis S∈ , if and only if ( ) ( ) { }TRR ie s s= . 
 Definition 3.20. (Relational general metarationality (RGMR)) For i N∈ , state 
s S∈  is relational general metarationality at e for DM i, denoted by ( )RGMR eis S∈ , if and 
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only if for all ( ) ( ) { }TRR \ix e s s∈ , { } ( ) ( ) ( )\N i iR x R e sφ φ
= ≠∩ . 
 Definition 3.21. (Relational symmetric metarationality (RSMR)) For i N∈ , state 
s S∈  is relational symmetric metarationality at e for DM i, denoted by ( )RSMR eis S∈ , if 
and only if for all ( ) ( ) { }TRR \ix e s s∈ , there exists { } ( ) ( ) ( )\N i iy R x R e sφ
=∈ ∩  such 
that ( ) ( )iz R e sφ
=∈  for all ( )iz R y∈ . 
 Definition 3.22. (Relational sequential stability (RSEQ)) For i N∈ , state s S∈  is 
relational sequential stability at e for DM i, denoted by ( )RSEQ eis S∈ , if and only if for all 
( ) ( ) { }TRR \ix e s s∈ , ( ) { } ( ) ( ) ( )\TRR N i ie x R e sφ φ
= ≠∩ . 
Detailed explanations of the definitions regarding applying attitudes to GMCR can 
be found in Inohara (2007).  In Chapter 5, a real-world conflict, within the dimension of 
international toxic waste disposal, illustrates how to implement this specific analysis in 
practice.   
 
3.4. Decision Support System GMCR II 
Decision support system (DSS) aims to computerize a specific methodology or 
algorithm, and therefore, facilitate users with a much more convenient and reliable way 
to implement the given methodology.  GMCR II is the second version of a DSS that is 
based on the methodology of GMCR. Because of its friendly user interface and 
comprehensive analysis engine, GMCR II provides a practical and efficient way to assist 
users in all phases of modeling, analyzing, and interpreting strategic conflicts. 
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Consequently, users may not only be someone who is specialized in conflict analysis or 
computer systems, but also be anybody in any discipline that deals with a particular 
dispute (Fang et al., 2003a, 2003b).  
This DSS can be beneficially applied to three main situations listed as follows (Fang 
et al., 2003b; Kilgour and Hipel, 2005). 
1) Analysis and simulation tool for conflict participants: GMCR II can be used in 
simulation or role-playing exercises that aim to achieve a better understanding or 
prediction of real world conflicts.  
2) Analysis and communication tool for mediators: GMCR II can be used by 
mediators to reconcile opposite situations, creat a more harmonious atmosphere in which 
to carry out negotiations, and assist in conducting and settling the disputes more 
effectively.  
3) Analysis tool for a third party or a regulator: GMCR II can be used by other 
interested parties, such as representatives of third party or a regulator, as a helpful 
mechanism to understand the conflict and perhaps seek fact-binding or legal-binding 
rules.  
The structure of GMCR II is illustrated in Figure 3.5.  Through the user interface, 
Modeling Subsystems build up the graph model with all related information, such as the 
DMs, their corresponding options, infeasibility information, and last but not least, 
preferences. Then, the modeling information enters the Analysis Engine for further 
investigation. The important analysis procedures, as mentioned in the last section, such 
as stability analysis, coalition analysis, and status quo analysis, are carried out in this 
subsystem.  Finally, the analysis results or resolutions, for instance, individual stabilities, 
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overall equilibria, and coalition stabilities, are constructed in the Output Subsystem and 
delivered to the users through the Graphical User Interface.  For a special user who has 
particular requirements, these requests may be directed additionally from the user 
interface to the Analysis Engine. 
Within each subsystem, GMCR II has its specific design to complete the functions. 
For example, preference information is one of the most critical and intractable issues.  
In GMCR II, this job could be fulfilled by three technologies, option weighting, option 
prioritizing, and direct ranking.  Each technology is employed to deal with a certain 
situation, and the direct ranking method can be combined with one of other two to fine 




Figure 3.5. GMCR II Structure (Fang et al., 2003a; Kilgour and Hipel, 2005).  
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3.5. Summary 
This chapter started with basic concepts of general conflict analysis and a brief 
history of Game Theory.  The introduction focused on the methodology of the Graph 
Model for Conflict Resolution.  The detailed explanation of four key components and 
stability definitions for 2-DM and n-DM (n>2) models demonstrated the characteristics 
and strength of GMCR.  The extended contents of sensitivity analysis and attitude 
analysis motivate further consideration. 
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Chapter 4 Generic Multi-Stage Graph Model 
Analysis for International Toxic Waste 




A generic multi-stage graph model is developed to analyze the international toxic 
waste disposal dispute.  This multilateral dispute involves nations with different cultures 
and is related to areas of the environment, legal issues and economical conditions.  The 
Generic Multi-Stage Graph Model organizes the analytic process by dividing the dispute 
into two stages: the dumping prevention stage and the conflict resolution stage.  Each 
stage may contain more than one model in regards to the actual situation. It follows, 
therefore, that a complex problem can be transformed into a combination of several 
simpler modules.  The methodology of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution 
(GMCR) is applied to each module in order to analyze feasible resolutions through the 
implementation of the Decision Support System GMCR II.  
 
4.1. Decision Makers 
As stated in Chapter 2, there are four parties involved in the international toxic waste 
disposal conflicts: the receiving country, the toxic waste trader, the United Nations, and 
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Non-Governmental Organizations.  A detailed discussion of each DM is presented in 
this section.  
 
4.1.1. The Receiving Countries (RC) 
Generally, only poor countries, or developing countries, are potential receiving 
countries due to the pressure of the financial difficulties they face.  These countries 
have usually undergone colonization, have war in their history, or are restricted by 
natural conditions, such as destitute natural resources and/or lean soil.  Most of them 
have not experienced industrial revolutions.  These countries desire development to 
improve their economies.  In order to maximize their revenue or gain further financial 
aid, poor countries have to concede to the pressures of international business.  “Trash 
for Food” is a manifestation of their concessions (Puckett, 1997). 
Furthermore, the sluggish, even stagnant economies cannot provide financial support 
to the operations of these countries.  The governments of these countries function in a 
disorderly and improper manner, because their capabilities for policy-making and 
legislation are often lacking.  The problem inevitability emerges in the environmental 
legislation and the relevant management systems (Asante-Duah and Sam, 1995):  
• Lacking complete environmental legal systems; 
• Lacking authorities to control and monitor the environmental issues; 
• Lacking disposal technologies to minimize the damage of hazardous wastes; 
• Lacking public attention and risk perception on environmental issues. 
All of these existing problems in developing countries result in their being targeted as 
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international hazardous wastes dumping grounds. 
Many developing countries possess excellent natural environments and abundant 
natural sources, such as the tropical rainforest of Africa and of the Amazon Rainforest in 
South America.  In past decades, these undeveloped areas were in a primarily 
undisturbed natural condition because of the low level of industrialization.  However, as 
development progressed in these countries, especially during recent energy and natural 
resources crises, the resulting overexploitation has severely impacted environment in 
these areas.  For example, Economist.com (2006) stated that “tropical forest is 
vanishing at a rate of 5% a decade, destroying habitats and releasing 3 billion tonnes of 
carbon dioxide a year, a fifth of global greenhouse emissions”.  Due to the shortage of 
knowledge in environmental protection technologies, these countries cannot efficiently 
prevent environmental damage, and as a result experience a higher risk of undergoing the 
tragic results.  
 
4.1.2. The Toxic Waste Trader (WT) 
Since toxic waste trade began in the 1970s, numerous hazardous wastes have been 
shipped from the USA, EU and Australia to poor countries in Africa, Asia, and South 
America (Clapp, 2001).  These highly developed nations are equipped with the most 
advanced manufacturing facilities in the world, which are able to produce a large amount 
of products and hazardous wastes.  The production of huge quantities of hazardous 
wastes has essentially created a business opportunity for toxic waste traders 
(Asante-Duah and Nagy, 1998).   
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Seemingly, the case of toxic waste trades relates to the commercial activities of toxic 
waste traders. Their operations include collecting, transporting, exporting, and importing 
toxic wastes. These companies organize toxic waste trade and profit from this activity.  
However, toxic waste traders only have a relatively share of the global waste trade 
market. The biggest beneficiaries behind the scenes are those large manufacturing 
companies or their holding companies. More precisely, these large corporations usually 
have strong connections with the governments of their nations, due to their solid 
financial strength.  As government supporters, their interests are consistent with their 
governments, and their influence may influence the policy making of countries.  
Therefore, it is understandable that many advanced countries are unwilling to ratify, or 
even undermine the Basel Convention and Ban Amendment.  
Furthermore, due to the tremendous number of cases of dumping toxic wastes, it is 
virtually impossible to collect data to quantify the activity of waste traders. Some traders 
may be based in the sending countries that have ratified the Convention and Ban 
Amendment, while others may not.  Traders often adopt some tricks to evade their 
responsibilities. For instance, the fact that most traders are multinational corporations, 
increases the difficulty of carrying out investigations.  Moreover, although these nations 
have ratified the Convention and Ban Amendment and could affect traders’ behaviors, 
there are still numerous hazardous wastes being transported across their borders.  
Because of the forgoing and other reasons, the countries of origin of waste trader, are not 
consider as separate DM in the hazardous waste conflict model developed in this thesis. 
Nevertheless, if for a specific dispute, a given country did exhibit decisive action in 
stopping harmful hazardous waste trade, it could be entertained as a separate DM in the 
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conflict model. 
4.1.3. The United Nations (UN)  
The largest of international organizations, the United Nations (UN), was created in 
1945.  Its purposes are to “maintain international peace and security; to develop friendly 
relations among nations; to cooperate in solving international economic, social, cultural 
and humanitarian problems and in promoting respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms; and to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in attaining these 
ends” (United Nations, 1945). 
 
4.1.3.1. UN system 
The establishment of the UN system seeks to exert its function, in order to reach the 
UN’s aims.  The UN system consists of six principal organs: the General Assembly, the 
Security Council, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Secretariat, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), and the Trusteeship Council. The UN also includes 
15 agencies and several programs and bodies. Figure 4.1 shows the organization of the 
UN system (News and Media Division, United Nations Department of Public 
Information, 2004). 
 
4.1.3.2. International Law 
The UN system has contributed to world peace and development since its foundation.  
Among all of the UN’s achievements, one of the most distinguished is the construction of 
an international law system consisting of conventions, treaties and standards.  The 
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international law provides a framework for regulating multilateral relationships and 
legally-binding settlements for international disputes. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. The United Nations System 
 
 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the UN 
system, established by the UN Charter, San Francisco (United States), in 1945, and was 
subsequently located in 1946 in the Peace Palace, The Hague (The Netherlands).  
The Court, which is composed of 15 judges, has a dual role: settling legal disputes in 
accordance with international law, and acting as an advisor on legal matters related to 
international disputes or authorized by organs and specialized agencies of the UN system 
(News and Media Division, United Nations Department of Public Information, 2004). 
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4.1.3.3. The Basel Convention as International Environmental Law 
The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and their Disposal was adopted in Basel, Switzerland in March 1989.  It entered 
into force in May 1992.  The Convention aims to minimize the generation of hazardous 
wastes in the world, and to dispose of the hazardous wastes locally and reduce their 
movements.  The Basel Convention constructs legal instruments to control 
transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and other wastes. 
Of first importance to the convention parties is the consideration of illegal 
transboundary movements of hazardous wastes as being criminal in nature.  Further, the 
parties are obligated to prohibit the import or export of hazardous wastes. 
 Secondly, The Ban Amendment calls for a full ban exports of hazardous wastes (for 
any purpose) from countries which is purposed in the new annex to the Basel Convention 
(Annex VII - Parties that are members of the EU, OECD, Liechtenstein) to any other 
Party to the Convention. In order to enter into force, the passage of the Ban amendment 
must obtain ratifications from three fourths of the Parties who accepted it. 
Thirdly, the definition and classification system of the convention enhances its 
implementation in controlling movement of wastes.  The convention requires each party 
to establish a management system to monitor movement of wastes and to minimize the 
generation of hazardous wastes.  
 Fourthly, the Conference of the Parties (COP) is the primary organ of the Basel 
Convention and is composed of all convention parties who have ratified and acceded to it.  
The meeting of COP, generally held at least once every two years, adopts decisions and 
develops policies related to the Basel Convention implementation, and to legal and 
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technical matters. 
Moreover, developing countries have signed a series of regional conventions and 
agreements in preventing traffic of illegal wastes.  These conventions have become 
supplementary to the Basel Convention.  Some examples are listed in Table 4.1.  
Additionally, many countries have enacted unilateral hazardous waste import bans.  
Colombia, for example, has a full waste import ban written into its national constitution.  
Many other countries have established legal bans or policies as a result of the regional 
commitments cited in Table 4.1.  For a detailed discussion and original references, 
please refer to Puckett (1997).  
 
4.1.3.4. The UN’s Role in the Conflict 
Generally, International Environmental Law recognizes the following mechanisms to 
settle the environmental dispute (Secretariat of the Basel Convention, 1989): 
1) Negotiation, Mediation and Conciliation - A peaceful procedure where, with the 
agreement of the disputants, a mediator or conciliator is appointed to conduct 
fact-finding procedures and seek solutions for a settlement.  The recommendation is not 
binding on the parties. 
2) Arbitration - A method of legally binding settlement of disputes by the 
International Court of Justice or Arbitration under the Basel Convention. 
In the UN system, UNEP fulfills an important role, which “is helping to develop the 
institutional and legal infrastructure to safeguard the global environment. Many 
international environmental agreements have been established with UNEP’s assistance.” 
UNEP has achieved effective cooperation and strong links with many partners: other 
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organs of the UN, international organizations, national governments, NGOs, business, 
industry, the media and civil society.  UNEP may also work as a mediator or conciliator 
in the dispute related to the environmental convention due to its wide-ranging influence 
and function (United Nations Environment Programme, 2004). 
 
 
Table 4.1. Regional Conventions 
Conventions Dates Member states Descriptions 








Prohibits the European Union (EU) from 
exporting nuclear or hazardous wastes to the ACP 
states, while the ACP countries agreed to prohibit 





member states of 
the Organization 
of African Unity 
Bans all forms of hazardous and nuclear waste 
imports to the African continent; forbids import of 










Bans all imports of hazardous and radioactive 
wastes and of toxic substances not permitted in the 
country of manufacture. 
Association of 




Prohibits the import of toxic wastes into the 
region of South-East Asia. So far this initiative has 





the South Pacific 
Forum States 
Prohibits each Pacific Island developing Party 
from importing hazardous and radioactive wastes 
from outside of the Convention area. Australia and 
New Zealand are prohibited from exporting 
hazardous or radioactive wastes to all other South 






The Parties to this 
Mediterranean 
regional seas 
Prohibits the export of hazardous and radioactive 
wastes to non-OECD countries and for those Parties 
that are not members of the European Community are 





4.1.4. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)  
A Non-Governmental Organization is a legal organization, which is independent 
from the control of any government.  The history of NGOs dates back to at least the 
mid-nineteenth century, and was important in the establishment of the UN.  As 
globalization impels intergovernmental action, NGOs are able to flourish in this situation. 
(Davies, 2006)  There are numerous NGOs in the world, which vary in their purposes 
and structures.  Some of them may operate for their own benefit or they may associate 
with a political party (Willetts, 2002).  In this thesis, an NGO is defined as an 
Environmental Group with a narrow focus on environmental protection, is not-for-profit 
in nature, such as the NGO Greenpeace. 
 Although NGOs are independent from any government, their goals reflect the wishes 
of the people and they have important influences on many international issues. NGOs 
cooperate with the UN and interact with governments to pursue their goals related to the 
environmental prevention.  Due to their efforts, NGOs obtain a wide base of support 
and strong connections to developing countries.  Furthermore, NGOs also maintain a 
healthy relationship with the media. The campaign that NGOs launched in 1989 was 
instrumental in the creation of the Basel Convention.  In waste disposal conflicts, NGOs 
can call for public attention to the dumping scandal, and conduct a campaign to press the 
involved parties to settle their disputes. 
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4.2. Modeling and Analysis   
A real world conflict is a dynamic phenomenon.  The first step in analyzing a 
conflict is to select the point of time (Fraser and Hipel, 1984).  When performing the 
Multi-Stage Graph Model Analysis, the international toxic waste disposal dispute can be 
generically divided into two stages: stage I: Dumping Prevention Stage (before a 
dumping takes place) and stage II: Dispute Resolution Stage (after a dumping occurs). 
The two stages of the international toxic waste dispute are illustrated in the Figure 4.2.  
This disposal dispute reflects the essentials of the conflict between global economic 
development and environmental protection. The Multi-Stage Graph Model Analysis 
applied to this dynamic conflict, focuses on analyzing uncertain situations and observing 
the evolution of the conflict from a strategic viewpoint.  For the purpose of conflict 
analysis, this model simplifies the complicated situation. Based upon this consideration, 
Stage I initializes the conflict with three DMs: Receiving Country, Waste Trader and 
United Nations. By comparing this with Stage I, Stage 2 involves one more DM, 
Non-Governmental Organizations, in which the analysis emphasizes on their effect on 
the evolution of the conflict. As discussed in the section 4.2.1.2, toxic waste traders and 
nations that are based in, are all beneficiaries of the global waste trade. The only 
difference is the ratio of how they share profits. A similar example is the tobacco industry. 
Smoking has been proven to be harmful to human health.  In particular, the chronic 
Nicotine Poisoning may increase the risk of cancer occurring and cause abortions in 
pregnant women.  However, there is not a national ban on the production of tobacco 






Figure 4.2. Flowchart of the Multi-Stage Analysis for the Toxic Waste Disposal Dispute  
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4.3. Stage I - Dispute Prevention 
In this stage, although waste disposal has not yet occurred, there always remains a 
possibility of illegal waste traffic.  There are three DMs involved in the conflict of the 
Dumping Prevention Stage: Receiving Country, Waste Trader and United Nations.  The 
poor countries might take a risk in receiving waste for financial benefit.  With 
increasing public consciousness of environmental protection, those poor counties might 
only accept wastes conditionally.  They may require proper treatment of toxic wastes or 
cleanup offer with any accident of leakage, or they may just ban them completely.  Due 
to the essential need for the pursuing of profits, the toxic waste trader always attempts to 
continue waste dumping.  As the originator and supervisor of international 
environmental law, the UN cooperates with nations and diverse organizations to control 
international toxic waste disposal, thus, minimizing its negative impact on the 
environment.  At a chosen time point, the available options for each DM are listed in 
Tables 4.2. 




1. Import wastes: Accept any potential toxic wastes. 
2. Require treatment: Accept proper disposal or require cleanup. 




4. Dispose wastes: Continue waste dumping.
5. Export and treat: Export and agree to clean up. 
6. Stop: Stop all dumping.  
United Nations 
(UN) 
7. Press WT: Bring pressure on WT to stop waste dumping. 





For each of the options, DMs may choose to implement it or not.  Thus, 
mathematically, a total of 8 options would represent 82  = 256 possible combinations.  
Nevertheless, many of them are impossible in reality.  For example, the Receiving 
Country must choose one and only one option, as does the Waste Trader. After 
considering these circumstances, GMCR II automatically generates a list of 36 feasible 
states for this model, as shown in Table 4.3. 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the procedure of specifying infeasibilities in GMCR II.  Two 
categories of infeasible states are removed: 1) “mutually exclusive” options, which 
removes the states that contain mutually exclusive options. For these DMs: Receiving 
Country and Waste Trader, their options are mutually exclusive. 2) “at least one” option, 
which is used to specify that, for the set of options, at least one option must be selected. 
In this conflict, Receiving Country must choose at least one from its options, and Waste 
Trader also must choose at least one from its options.  
 
  
Figure 4.3. Model in Stage I – Remove Infeasible States Using GMCR II 
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Table 4.3. Feasible States of Model 1 in Stage I 
State-  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Receiving Country                   
1. Import wastes Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N N 
2.Require treatment   N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y Y N Y N N Y N 
3.Refuse and ratify N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y 
Waste Trader                   
4.Dispose wastes Y Y Y N N N N N N Y Y N N N N N N N 
5.Export and treat N N N Y Y Y N N N N N N Y Y Y N N N 
6.Stop N N N N N N Y Y Y N N Y N N N Y Y Y 
United Nations                   
7.Press WT N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
8.Encourage RC      N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
                   
State  19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
Receiving Country                   
1. Import wastes Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N N 
2.Require treatment   N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N 
3.Refuse and ratify N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y 
Waste Trader                   
4.Dispose wastes Y Y Y N N N N N N Y Y Y N N N N N N 
5.Export and treat N N N Y Y Y N N N N N N Y Y Y N N N 
6.Stop N N N N N N Y Y Y N N N N N N Y Y Y 
United Nations                   
7.Press WT N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 




Table 4.4 depicts the relative preference information for this model.  As shown, the 
numbers from top down represent the corresponding options in the order of most 
preferred to least preferred.  For instance, from the Receiving Country’s point of view 
(column of RC), “-4” denotes that the Receiving Country most prefers that Waste Trader 
stop dumping; “2” denotes that Receiving Country accepts conditional dumping; “3 IF 8” 
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represents that the Receiving Country would refuse dumping and ratify the convention if 
UN encourages it; “7 IF 4” represents that the UN would press the Waste Trader to stop if 
the Waste Trader continued dumping. Similarly, the preferences of the Waste Trader and 
the UN are denoted by those numbers in the corresponding columns. 
 













3 IF 8 












After the model initialization, the conflict analysis can be carried out by using the 
associated Decision Dupport System GMCR II.  As introduced in Chapter 3, GMCR II 
performs equilibria analysis effectively with its friendly user interface and powerful 
analysis engine.  Figure 4.4 is the screen shot of equilibria dialog in GMCR II, which 
illustrates the two possible resolutions’ strong stabilities. R, GMR, SMR,SEQ,NM,and 
L(2) in the lower rows correspondingly represent Nash Stability, General Metarationality, 
Symmetric Metarationality, Sequential Stability with a horizon of two, Non-Myopic 
Stability and Limited Move Stability, which have been introduced in Chapter 3.  The 
tick in the column of each state indicates that the state is an equilibrium under the 
corresponding solution concept in that row.  Undoubtedly, states 29 and 32 are 
equilibria under all listed solution concepts. 
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Figure 4.4. Model in Stage I – Equilibria in GMCR II 
 
Table 4.5. Model 1 in Stage I – Summary of Equilibria 
DMs and Options 29 32
Receiving Country
1. Import wastes 
2. Require treatment 








4. Dispose wastes 









7. Press WT 






Table 4.5 summarizes the outcome of two strong stable possible resolutions, which 
are stable under all solution concepts.  In these two possible resolutions, the Receiving 
Country will accept the toxic dumping conditionally, and hold the Waste Trader for the 
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proper treatment or cleanup for accidental leakage.  The Waste Trader may continue to 
dump illegally or agree to dispose toxic wastes conditionally.  As usual, the UN will 
press the Waste Trader to stop illegally dumping and call for ratification by the Receiving 
Country.  The results of the prevention stage analyses indicate the possibility of the 
dispute arising.  Once the dumping occurs, the disposal conflict analysis needs to move 
to the next stage as shown in Figure 4.2.: Flowchart of the Multi-Stage Analysis. 
 
4.4. Stage II - Dispute Resolution  
As shown in Figure 4.2, in this stage, the dispute has already occurred.  The 
conflict analyses are classified into two models base on the Receiving Country’s status of 
ratification of the Basel Ban Amendment.  
 
4.4.1. Model 2: Receiving Country has Ratified the Basel Ban 
Amendment 
The disposal dispute is under the jurisdiction of the Basel Convention and its 
Amendments due to the Receiving Country having ratified the Basel Convention.  The 
involved DMs and corresponding options are depicted in Table 4.6.   
For each DM, one and only one option can be chosen.  Furthermore, in addition to the 
two categories of infeasibilities, one more technique, option dependence, is employed in 
this model. This technique can be used to specify two patterns, one of which can occur 
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only when the other one is satisfied.  Specifically, in this case, the UN can only conduct 
arbitration when the Receiving Country files a claim and the Waste Trader accepts the 
arbitration.  Thus, only 10 states are feasible.  The procedure of removing infeasible 
states are shown in Figure 4.5, and the obtained 10 feasible states are listed in Table 4.7. 
 




1. Demand compensation: Insist that the trader provide compensation, 
including cleaning up and paying penalties 
2. File claim: Submit the dispute to the UN. 
Waste Trader 
(WT) 
3. Accept UN’s offer: Accept arbitration or conciliation. 
4. Compensate: Agree to compensate RC. 
United Nations 
(UN) 
5. Conciliate: Conduct conciliation talks between RC and WT. 




7. Campaign: Influence public to put pressure on WT and press it to stop 
dumping. 
 
Table 4.7. Feasible States of Model 2 in Stage II 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Receiving Country           
1. Demand compensation Y N Y N N Y N Y N N 
2. File claim N Y N Y Y N Y N  Y Y 
Waste Trader           
3. Accept UN’s offer Y Y N N Y Y Y N N Y 
4. Compensate N N Y Y N N N Y Y N 
United Nations           
5. Conciliate Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N 
6. Arbitrate           
Non-Governmental Organizations N N N N Y N N N N Y 
7. Campaign N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y 
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Figure 4.5. Model 2 in Stage II – Remove Infeasible States using GMCR II 
 
 
Table 4.8 provides the preference information of this model. The details are 
explained as follows. The Receiving Country will demand compensation for the damage 
of the disposal according to the convention, or, submit a conciliation or arbitration 
request to the UN if the Waste Trader refuses to provide compensation.  The Waste 
Trader prefers the UN not to arbitrate, and the Receiving Country not to file a claim.  
The Waste Trader also tries to avoid compensation.  The UN prefers that the Waste 
Trader to agree to compensate and accept UN’s conciliation or arbitration if the 
Receiving Country files a claim.  The UN also likes to see public attention and 
corresponding pressure on the Waste Trader. 
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2 IF -4 







3 IF 2 
7 
4 
2 IF -4 
7 
 
Having delivered data into the GMCRII, only one state satisfies all stability 
definitions, as shown in Figure 4.6. 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Model 2 in Stage II – Equilibria in GMCR II. 
 
Table 4.9 summarizes the outcome of this model.  Impelled by this resolution, the 
NGOs will launch a campaign against the international waste disposal.  The Receiving 
Country prefers a legal procedure by filing a claim to the UN.  The UN will seek a 
settlement as a mediator, since the Waste Trader does not agree to accept to compensate. 
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Table 4.9. Mode 2 – Summary of Equilibrium 
DMs and Options 7
Receiving Country
1. Demand compensation 














7. Campaign  Y 
 
4.4.2. Model 3: Receiving Country has not Ratified the Basel 
Ban Amendment 
The disposal dispute is not under the jurisdiction of the Basel Convention and its 
Amendments due to the Receiving Country not having ratified the convention. 
Accordingly, the available options to these four DMs are different from the options 
presented in Model 2. The Receiving Country has the option of demanding compensation, 
but it’s less powerful than in Model 2.  As well, the Receiving Country chooses to ratify 
the Basel Convention instead of filing a claim according to the convention.  The Waste 
Trader may refuse or agree to compensate.  The UN cannot put pressure on the Waste 
Trader directly, but may press the Receiving Country to ratify the Convention.  The 
NGOs will call for public attention.  The DMs and their corresponding options are 
presented in Table 4.10. 
In this case, there are no infeasible state needs to be removed. Table 4.11 lists all the 
32 feasible states of this conflict.  
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1. Demand compensation: Insist that the trader compensate, including 
cleaning up and paying penalty. 
2. Ratify: Ratify the Convention. 
Waste Trader 
(WT) 
3. Compensate: Agree to compensate and accept punishments. 
United Nations 
(UN) 




5. Campaign: Call for public attention to WT and press it to stop dumping. 
 
 
Table 4.11. Feasible States of Model 3 in Stage II 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Receiving Country                 
1.Demand compensation N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y 
2.Ratify N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y 
Waste Trader                 
3.Compensate N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y 
United Nations                 
4.Press N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Non-Government Organizations                 
5.Campaign N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
 
 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
Receiving Country                 
1.Demand compensation N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y 
2.Ratify N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y 
Waste Trader                 
3.Compensate N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y 
United Nations                 
4.Press N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Non-Government Organizations                 
5.Campaign Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table 4.12 describes the preference statements for option prioritization in this model. 
As shown, the Receiving Country most prefers that the Waste Trader agrees to 
compensate and pays all of the punishments, followed by the NGOs call for public 
attention to the Waste Trader and press it to stop dumping. Then, the Receiving Country 
would like to insist that the Waste Trader compensates and ratifies the Convention. For 
the Waste Trader, it would like other DMs not conduct any action against it. The United 
Nations and NGOs, basically, have the same preferences. The only difference is that 
NGOs want the Receiving Country to demand the compensation from the Waste Trader. 
 


























2 IF 4 
5 
 
Having delivered data into the GMCRII, two possible resolutions satisfy all stability 
definitions, as shown in Figure 4.7. In addition, Table 4.13 summarizes the outcome of 
this model. Both possible resolutions suggest that UN may or may not push the 
Receiving Country to ratify the Basel Convention for a full ban on the toxic waste 
dumping in the future. And the Receiving Country will claim a compensation for its loss 
and ratify the Convention for future protection.  However, the Waster Trader will refuse 
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Figure 4.7. Model 3 in Stage II – Equilibria in GMCR II. 
 
 
Table 4.13. Model 3 in Stage II – Summary of Equilibria 
DMs and Options 20 28
Receiving Country







3. Accept compensation N N 
United Nations
4. Press N Y 
Non-Government Organizations
5. Campaign  Y Y 
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4.5. Summary    
In this chapter, a generic multi-stage approach, consisting of three specific analytical 
models, is developed and analyzed by employing the methodology of GMCR. A 
real-world case study of Ivory Coast toxic waste dumping dispute is investigated in the 
next chapter in order to illustrate how to implement this generic approach in practice. 
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Chapter 5 Case Study: Ivory Coast Toxic 




Ivory Coast was once one of the most prosperous countries in West Africa.  
However, political turmoil and civil war destroyed the wealth and social structure of this 
country (Central Intelligence Agency, 2007).  A recent environmental crisis has 
worsened the situation even further.  In August 2006, Abidjan, the largest city and 
economic capital of Ivory Coast, experienced a tragedy caused by toxic waste dumping.  
As of October 2006, at least 10 people had died and thousands had sought medical 
treatment (Johnson, 2006; MacKenzie, 2006; Polgreen and Simons, 2006).  This 
horrible event caused a global uproar over the growing trade in hazardous wastes.  
 The Ivory Coast toxic waste dumping case reveals a complex conflict that entangles 
different parties (local government, toxic waste trader, the United Nations and 
Non-Governmental Organizations) representing the areas of finance, law and the 
environment.  In this chapter, the developed generic graph model is applied to study this 
dispute.  With some adjustments, according to the specific situations, insights are 
generated.  Through this case study, the method for implementation of the generic 




Ivory Coast, officially called République de Côte d'Ivoire, is a western African 
country.  Figure 5.1 shows a map of Ivory Coast.  According to the World Factbook 
(Central Intelligence Agency, 2007), it was once one of the most prosperous countries 
due to its cocoa production exports and related foreign investment.  Currently, it is still 
one of the world’s largest producers and exporters of coffee, cocoa beans, and palm oil. 
However, from December 1999 to 2003, a military coup, a political stalemate, and other 
issues sparked the civil war, which destroyed the country’s economic development and 
the lives of its people.  Presently, some of these issues remain unresolved, and 
thousands of French and West African troops remain in Ivory Coast for the purpose of 
peacekeeping and other military related processes.  
Nevertheless, the situation in this country was further deteriorated by a recent 
environmental crisis, more specifically, a toxic waste dumping event.  In August 2006, 
400 tons of mixtures of gasoline, water and caustic washings used to clean oil drums 
were dumped in at least 10 sites around the city of Abidjan (African News Dimension, 
2006). Tragically, as a result, no less than 10 people died, dozens were hospitalized and 
more than 85,000 sought medical treatment for nausea, vomiting and headaches due to 
the toxic fumes from hydrogen sulphide, petroleum distillates and sodium hydroxide 
(Johnson, 2006; MacKenzie, 2006; Polgreen and Simons, 2006).  According to the 
reports of Green Peace and several major media organizations, a ship, named Probo 
Koala, was identified as the culprit.  This Greek-managed and Panamanian-flagged ship 
was leased by a Dutch-based company named Trafigura Beheer B.V., one of the world’s 
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leading commodity traders specializing in petrol, gasoline and base metals (Doyle, 2006).  
It maintains over 58 offices in 46 countries throughout Europe, North, Central and South 




Figure 5.1. Map of Ivory Coast (Central Intelligence Agency, 2004) 
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5.2. Model Building 
 The model developed in this chapter analyzes the situation at the beginning of 
November, 2006.  At that point in time, the dumping had already occurred, and the 
receiving country, Ivory Coast, had not yet ratified the 1995 Ban Amendment.  
Therefore, this model can be referred as the Model 3 of Stage II, Dispute Resolution 
Stage, according to the multi-stage graph model discussed in Chapter 4.   
The involved DMs and corresponding options are listed in Table 5.1.  The decision 
support system, GMCR II, is used in this thesis to facilitate the graph model analysis.  
Figure 5.2 shows the interface of DMs and options in GMCR II. 
 
 




1. Refuse Waste: Refuse future toxic waste dumping.
2. Demand compensation: Insist that the trader compensate, including cleaning 
up and paying penalty. 
3. Enforce: Ratify the 1995 Ban Amendment.
Toxic Waste Trader 
(TR) 
4. Compensate: Agree to compensate and accept punishments. 
United Nations 
(UN) 









Figure 5.2. GMCR II – DMs and Options 
 
5.3. Specify Infeasibilities 
GMCR II provides four techniques to remove infeasible states. Three of the 
techniques, Mutually Exclusive, “At least one” Option, and Option Dependence, are 
employed in this case study as shown in Figure 5.3.  
    
 Figure 5.3. GMCR II – Specify Infeasibilities 
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For the Toxic Waste Trader, at least one option has to be chosen, Furthermore, only 
when Ivory Coast demands compensation will the Toxic Waste Trader choose to 
compensate.  The reason is quite obvious: if there is no punishment at all, how can the 
company accept to compensate? After removing all infeasible states, 48 feasible states 
are retained and shown in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2. Ivory Coast Conflict - Feasible States 
Options 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Ivory Coast                         
1. Refuse waste N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
2. Demand compensation N N Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y
3. Enforce N N N N Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y N N Y Y
Waste Trader                         
4. Compensate N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y
United Nations                         
5. Press Ivory Coast N N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Non-Governmental Organizations                         
6. Campaign N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
 
 
Options 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48
Ivory Coast                         
1. Refuse waste N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
2. Demand compensation N N Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y
3. Enforce N N N N Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y N N Y Y
Waste Trader                         
4. Compensate N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y
United Nations                         
5. Press Ivory Coast N N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Non-Governmental Organizations                         





There are three techniques provided by GMCR II to generate the preference profile 
in different situations: Option Weighting, Option Prioritizing, and Direct Ranking. In this 
section, Option Prioritizing is chosen to estimate the preference ranking in this conflict.  
Table 5.3 depicts preferences for each DM.  Detailed explanations are presented below. 
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Facing such a serious toxic pollution situation, Ivory Coast most prefers that Trader 
agrees to compensate, accepts the punishment, and then, stops any future dumping action. 
Next, the NGOs call for public attention to be brought to bear on the Trader and thereby 
to pressure it to stop dumping.  Ivory Coast itself refuses any more dumping, demands 
compensation, and ratifies the 1995 Amendment when requested to do so by the UN.  
 From the Trader’s point of view, the most preferred option is that Ivory Coast does 
not demand any compensation at all.  Secondly, the Trader would like to refuse to 
provide any compensation requested by Ivory Coast and does not want Ivory Coast 
refuse the future dumping or to ratify the Amendment.  It is also preferred by the Trader 
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that the NGOs not seek publicity to pressure the Trader to stop dumping.  
 For the UN, its first preference is that the Trader accepts the compensation and 
punishment.  It would then prefer to see Ivory Coast ratify the Amendment in order that 
Ivory Coast may enjoy protection from any further toxic dumping through the protection 
offered by international law.  Next, the UN prefers that the Trader accepts any 
punishment it imposes.  Finally, the UN wants Ivory Coast to refuse dumping and the 
NGOs to seek publicity to pressure the Trader to stop dumping. 
 As for the NGOs, they most prefer that the Trader agree to compensate and accept 
punishment.  Secondly, they prefer that Ivory Coast demand compensation, refuse any 
future dumping, and ratify the Amendment if the UN asks it to do so.  Finally, the 
NGOs definitely want to call for public attention to be applied to the Trader thereby 
pressuring it to stop dumping.  
 
5.5. Stability Analysis 
Once the preference profiles for all DMs are determined, GMCR II is ready to attain 
the stability and equilibria results for this problem.  In this case study, only state 44 is 
strongly stable under all stability definitions (Table 5.4, Figure 5.7).  As shown, Ivory 
Coast will refuse any future waste dumping, demand the Trader to compensate, and ratify 
the 1995 Amendment.  The Trader will try to refuse to compensate.  The United 
Nations will put pressure on Ivory Coast and request it to ratify the Amendment for 
future protection.  The Non-Government Organizations will definitely call for public 




Figure 5.7. GMCR II – Equilibrium 
  
Table 5.4. Ivory Coast Conflict - Summary of Equilibrium 
Options 44 
Ivory Coast  
1. Refuse waste Y 
2. Demand compensation Y 
3. Enforcement Y 
Waste Trader  
4. Compensate N 
United Nations  
5. Press Ivory Coast Y 
Non-Governmental Organizations  
6. Campaign Y 
 
5.6. Attitude Analysis  
As introduced in Chapter 3, consideration of the attitudes of DMs along with the 
regular stability analysis is a very useful expansion for better understanding a given 
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conflict situation.  In the Ivory Coast waste dumping dispute, the application of the 
attitude analysis may demonstrate how the states of a conflict are dependent upon the 
attitudes of DMs.  By comparing attitude analysis with the conventional conflict 
analysis, changes may occur in the resolution of the conflict due to the consideration of 
the social and psychological factors in the conflict.  According to the definitions of the 
attitude analysis, the standard analysis is considered as “rational”, based upon an 
assumption that all DMs are rational.  Specifically, each DM in this situation is positive 
towards itself and neutral towards its opponents.  In this section, in order to gain a 
comprehensive understanding of the Ivory Coast dispute, it is re-analyzed and discussed 
from the attitude perspective in detail.   
 
5.6.1. Attitudes in the Ivory Coast Conflict 
 Attitudes of all DMs within this dispute are shown in Table 5.5.  Each entry of this 
table stands for the attitude of the column DM towards the row DM.  It is quite intuitive 
to obtain this attitude information from the real situation.  For example, in the first 
column, the receiving country, Ivory Coast, has a negative attitude towards the Trader, 
while is indifferent with respect to itself and other DMs.  Similarly, the Trader is 
negative towards Ivory Coast and indifferent with respect to itself and other DMs.  The 





Table 5.5. Attitudes in the Ivory Coast Waste Dumping Conflict 
 IC TR UN NGOs 
IC ,IC ICe  = 0 ,IC TRe  = ─ ,IC UNe  = 0 ,IC NGOe  = 0 
TR ,TR ICe  = ─ ,TR TRe  = 0 ,TR UNe  = 0 ,TR NGOe  = 0 
UN ,UN ICe  = 0 ,UN TRe  = 0 ,UN UNe  = 0 ,UN NGOe  = 0 
NGOs ,NGO ICe  = 0 ,NGO TRe  = 0 ,NGO UNe  = 0 ,NGO NGOe  = 0 
 
5.6.2. Relational Stability Analysis 
 Containing the attitude information, a stability analysis tableau, as illustrated in 
Table 5.7, can be constructed.  For each DM, all of the states are shown from the most 
to least preferred.  Beneath these states, all of the possible UIs (see details in Chapter 3) 
from the particular state are listed.  For instance, Ivory Coast can get preference 
improvement by unilaterally moving from state 43 to 40 or 44.  Additionally, for 
explanation purposes, the reachable lists of each state for all DMs are displayed in Table 
5.6.  For example, state 43 has the reachable lists of ( ) { }43 37,38,39,40,41,42,44ICR = , 
( ) { }43 47TDR = , and ( ) { }43 31UNR = , ( ) { }43 19NGOR = , for Ivory Coast, the Trader, the 
United Nations, and the Non-Government Organizations, respectively.  The reachable 
lists describe the set of unilateral movements from a specific state, which are referred to 
as the rational response list, ( )( )iTRR e s , in the attitude analysis.  Now, state 43 is 
taken as an example to demonstrate the detailed investigation by implementing the 
relational definitions of attitude analysis introduced in Chapter 3.  
For Ivory Coast, it has a negative attitude towards the Trader.  Related to state 43, 
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the Trader’s preference states 42 43TR  and 38 43TR .  So, ( ),44, 40 RP 43IC TRe = − . 
Furthermore, as states 44 and 40 are relational preferred states at state 43 for Ivory Coast 
with respect to all DMs in the conflict, ( )44, 40 TRP 43ICe  and, thus, 
( ) { }TRR 43 43, 44, 40IC = .  For the Trader, state 43 has the reachable list of 
( ) { }43 47TDR = .  Being neutral to itself, the Trader prefers state 43 to 47.  Also, as the 
Trader has a negative attitude towards Ivory Coast, Ivory Coast’s preferences must be 
examined to determine the Trader’s relational reply with respect to Ivory Coast.  As 
shown in Table 5.7, 47 43IC . Hence, it can be obtained that ( ) { }TRR 43 43TR = , 
which indicates that state 43 is RNash stable for the Trader.  Similarly, since the other 
two DMs are neutral to all DMs, it is easy to see that state 43 is RNash for both of them. 
However, as Ivory Coast does not have the set where ( ) { }TRR 43 43IC = , state 43 is not 
RNash stable in this problem.  
Furthermore, since ( ) { }TRR 43 43, 44, 40IC = , the only movement that can be done by 
Ivory Coast is from state 43 to state 40 or 44.  From state 40, the Trader has no total 
relational replies, i.e., Trader cannot sanction Ivory Coast to make this movement. Thus, 
there exists no RSEQ stabilities for each Ivory Coast.  When it comes to RGMR and 
RSMR stabilities for Ivory Coast, again, the only movement can be carried out by Ivory 
Coast from state 43 is to move to state 40 or 44.  For all of the other DMs, both states 
40 and 44 are sanctioned and cannot move to any other state.  This shows that state 43 
is both RGMR and RSMR for Ivory Coast. 
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Table 5.6. Reachable Lists 
States   Ivory Coast     Trader   UN   NGOs 
1   2 3 4 5 6 7 8         13   25 
2  1 3 4 5 6 7 8     14  26 
3  1 2 4 5 6 7 8   9  15  27 
4  1 2 3 5 6 7 8   10  16  28 
5  1 2 3 4 6 7 8     17  29 
6  1 2 3 4 5 7 8     18  30 
7  1 2 3 4 5 6 8   11  19  31 
8  1 2 3 4 5 6 7   12  20  32 
9  10 11 12       3  21  33 
10  9 11 12       4  22  34 
11  9 10 12       7  23  35 
12  9 10 11       8  24  36 
13  14 15 16 17 18 19 20     1  37 
14  13 15 16 17 18 19 20     2  38 
15  13 14 16 17 18 19 20   21  3  39 
16  13 14 15 17 18 19 20   22  4  40 
17  13 14 15 16 18 19 20     5  41 
18  13 14 15 16 17 19 20     6  42 
19  13 14 15 16 17 18 20   23  7  43 
20  13 14 15 16 17 18 19   24  8  44 
21  22 23 24       15  9  45 
22  21 23 24       16  10  46 
23  21 22 24       19  11  47 
24  21 22 23       20  12  48 
25  26 27 28 29 30 31 32     37  1 
26  25 27 28 29 30 31 32     38  2 
27  25 26 28 29 30 31 32   33  39  3 
28  25 26 27 29 30 31 32   34  40  4 
29  25 26 27 28 30 31 32     41  5 
30  25 26 27 28 29 31 32     42  6 
31  25 26 27 28 29 30 32   35  43  7 
32  25 26 27 28 29 30 31   36  44  8 
33  34 35 36       27  45  9 
34  33 35 36       28  46  10 
35  33 34 36       31  47  11 
36  33 34 35       32  48  12 
37  38 39 40 41 42 43 44     25  13 
38  37 39 40 41 42 43 44     26  14 
39  37 38 40 41 42 43 44   45  27  15 
40  37 38 39 41 42 43 44   46  28  16 
41  37 38 39 40 42 43 44     29  17 
42  37 38 39 40 41 43 44     30  18 
43  37 38 39 40 41 42 44   47  31  19 
44  37 38 39 40 41 42 43   48  32  20 
45  46 47 48       39  33  21 
46  45 47 48       40  34  22 
47  45 46 48       43  35  23 
48   45 46 47             44   36   24 
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For each single state, Table 5.7 is employed to carry out all these analyses and to 
check all of the four stability definitions. The results are depicted in Table 5.8.  
From Table 5.8, note that the same equilibrium, as the previous calculation without 
considering the attitude information, state 44 is achieved.  This result confirms the 




Table 5.7. Relational Stability Analysis Tableau  
( )1 11 12 13 140, , 0, 0e e e e e= = = − = = , ( )2 21 22 23 24, 0, 0, 0e e e e e= = − = = = , 







Table 5.8. Stability and Equilibrium 
States  RNash  RSEQ RSMR RGMR  # of EQ 
1   TR, NGOs  TR, NGOs TR, NGOs TR, NGOs  0 
2  TR, NGOs  TR, NGOs TR, NGOs TR, NGOs  0 
3  TR  TR TR, NGOs TR, NGOs  0 
4  TR  TR TR, NGOs TR, NGOs  0 
5  TR  TR, NGOs TR, NGOs TR, NGOs  0 
6  TR  TR, NGOs TR, NGOs TR, NGOs  0 
7  TR  TR, NGOs TR, NGOs TR, NGOs  0 
8  IC, TR  IC, TR, NGOs IC, TR, NGOs IC, TR, NGOs  0 
9  IC  IC, UN, NGOs IC, UN, NGOs IC, UN, NGOs  0 
10    IC, UN, NGOs IC, UN, NGOs IC, UN, NGOs  0 
11  IC  IC, UN, NGOs IC, UN, NGOs IC, UN, NGOs  0 
12    IC, UN, NGOs IC, UN, NGOs IC, UN, NGOs  0 
13  TR, UN  TR, UN TR, UN TR, UN  0 
14  TR, UN  TR, UN, NGOs TR, UN, NGOs TR, UN, NGOs  0 
15  TR, UN  TR, UN, NGOs TR, UN, NGOs TR, UN, NGOs  0 
16  TR, UN  TR, UN TR, UN, NGOs TR, UN, NGOs  0 
17  TR, UN  TR, UN TR, UN, NGOs TR, UN, NGOs  0 
18  TR, UN  TR, UN, NGOs TR, UN, NGOs TR, UN, NGOs  0 
19  TR, UN  TR, UN, NGOs TR, UN, NGOs TR, UN, NGOs  0 
20  IC, TR, UN  IC, TR, UN, NGOs IC, TR, UN, NGOs IC, TR, UN, NGOs  3 
21  IC, UN  IC, UN IC, UN, NGOs IC, UN, NGOs  0 
22  UN  IC, UN, NGOs IC, UN, NGOs IC, UN, NGOs  0 
23  UN  IC, UN, NGOs IC, UN, NGOs IC, UN  0 
24  UN  IC, UN, NGOs IC, UN, NGOs IC, UN  0 
25  IC, TR  IC, TR, NGOs IC, TR, NGOs IC, TR, NGOs  0 
26  TR, NGOs  TR, NGOs IC, TR, NGOs IC, TR, NGOs  0 
27  TR, NGOs  TR, NGOs IC, TR, NGOs IC, TR, NGOs  0 
28  TR, NGOs  TR, NGOs IC, TR, NGOs IC, TR, NGOs  0 
29  IC, TR, NGOs  IC, TR, NGOs IC, TR, NGOs IC, TR, NGOs  0 
30  TR, NGOs  TR, NGOs IC, TR, NGOs IC, TR, NGOs  0 
31  TR, NGOs  TR, NGOs IC, TR, NGOs IC, TR, NGOs  0 
32  TR, NGOs  TR, NGOs IC, TR, NGOs IC, TR, NGOs  0 
33  IC, UN, NGOs  IC, UN, NGOs IC, UN, NGOs IC, UN, NGOs  0 
34  , NGOs  IC, UN, NGOs IC, UN, NGOs IC, UN, NGOs  0 
35  IC, NGOs  IC, UN, NGOs IC, UN, NGOs IC, UN, NGOs  0 
36  NGOs  IC, UN, NGOs IC, UN, NGOs IC, UN, NGOs  0 
37  IC, TR, NGOs  IC, TR, UN, NGOs IC, TR, UN, NGOs IC, TR, UN, NGOs  3 
38  TR, UN, NGOs  TR, UN, NGOs IC, TR, UN, NGOs IC, TR, UN, NGOs  2 
39  TR, UN, NGOs  TR, UN, NGOs IC, TR, UN, NGOs IC, TR, UN, NGOs  2 
40  TR, UN, NGOs  TR, UN, NGOs IC, TR, UN, NGOs IC, TR, UN, NGOs  2 
41  TR, UN, NGOs  TR, UN, NGOs IC, TR, UN, NGOs IC, TR, UN, NGOs  2 
42  TR, UN, NGOs  TR, UN, NGOs IC, TR, UN, NGOs IC, TR, UN, NGOs  2 
43  TR, UN, NGOs  TR, UN, NGOs IC, TR, UN, NGOs IC, TR, UN, NGOs  2 
44  IC, TR, UN, NGOs  IC, TR, UN, NGOs IC, TR, UN, NGOs IC, TR, UN, NGOs  4 
45  UN, NGOs  IC, UN, NGOs IC, UN, NGOs IC, UN, NGOs  0 
46  UN, NGOs  IC, UN, NGOs IC, UN, NGOs IC, UN, NGOs  0 
47  UN, NGOs  IC, UN, NGOs IC, UN, NGOs IC, UN, NGOs  0 





In this chapter, a case study of the Ivory Coast toxic waste dumping conflict is 
analyzed by using the generic model for the international toxic waste disposal. In 
addition to the regular stability analysis, the attitudes aspect is also taken into 
consideration.  This attitude analysis further confirms the analysis resolution and 























In this thesis, a multi-stage generic graph model for international toxic waste 
disposal conflicts is developed and analyzed.  More specifically, the model divides toxic 
waste disputes into two stages consisting of the dumping prevention and dispute 
resolution stages. Then, the practical conflict analysis methodology, the Graph Model for 
Conflict Resolution, is employed in both stages to carry out in-depth investigations at the 
strategic level of decision making.  Additionally, a case study of the Ivory Coast toxic 
waste dumping controversy, a recent real-world scandal, is used to demonstrate how to 
implement this multi-stage generic model in practice. 
 
6.1. Contributions  
The main contributions of this thesis are as follows. 
1) A multi-stage generic graph model is developed to investigate the international 
toxic waste disposal conflict. Rather than only analyzing the conflict afterwards, this 
model takes both the prevention and resolution stage into consideration. Through 
comprehensive analyses over different stages, the proposed model assists the DMs and 
other interested parties in making informed decisions and facilitates in providing making 
them with a better understanding of the conflict situation. 
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2) In the problem resolution stage, two graph models are built corresponding to the 
different status of the waste receiving countries, which the most important participants in 
the international toxic waste disposal conflict.  Some receiving countries have already 
ratified the Basel Convention, while others have not.  Due to this difference, both of 
these countries and the United Nations would have dissimilar options and preferences. 
Therefore, two models are presented in this thesis in order to solve this problem.  Note 
that feedback is allowed when one model has obtained resolution. 
3) Attitude issues are taken into account along with the regular graph model 
analysis.  Attitudes may have great impact on any conflict situation.  Employing the 
graph model analysis accompanied with attitudes assists DMs and other interested parties 
to understand the given situations more thoroughly and to ascertain the plausibility of the 
predicted equilibria, or resolutions. The investigation further confirms the achieved 
resolutions and the robustness of the proposed model. 
4) In addition to three regular DMs, the NGOs are considered in the generic model. 
Nowadays, more and more NGOs are dedicated to improving the global environment.  
Their efforts are impressive and, therefore, cannot be ignored.  
5) A real-world case, the Ivory Coast toxic waste dumping problem, is investigated 
by using a specific sub-model of the proposed generic graph model, model 3 of the 
dispute resolution stage.  With further considerations of the attitude analysis, the model 
suggests each DM’s possible future tendency of the current situation. Thus, the validity 
and practicability of the model (Stage 2 only) are illustrated.  
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6.2. Future Work    
Due to the potentials of high profits, the toxic waste trading will continue to be 
attractive and, thus, exist for a relatively long term (Asante-Duah and Nagy, 1998). 
Besides the toxic waste conflict that we analyzed in this thesis, there are other related 
conflicts occurring worldwide.  For example, as an international law, the Basel 
Convention and Ban Amendment is actually an environmental agreement.  In many case, 
there exists some debate concerning the jurisdiction and scope of the Basel Convention 
and Ban Amendment.  It is inevitable that conflicts will arise due to the overlap of the 
environmental agreement and the agreements of the World Trade Organization.  
Furthermore, the existing dispute settlement methods of the UN may also cause conflict.
 Additionally, because of the improvement of international law, the situation of 
international waste trading contains more and more uncertain issues, especially the 
preference information of different DMs.  Li et al. (2004a) introduced a binary relation 
to represent the uncertain preference of an involved DM. Four graph-model stability 
concepts are also redefined based on this uncertain preference structure.  It would be an 
interesting yet challenging task to integrate the uncertainty into our generic model.  
Furthermore, in modeling conflicts, the consideration of nations where toxic wastes 
originate or toxic waste traders are based in could be a factor in some particular cases.  
Because these nations may have enacted legislations on controlling toxic waste trading, 
their governments may be able to take actions. In those particular cases, the government 
should be included as a DM in a conflict model.   
Moreover, the dynamic nature of the toxic waste trading problem causes significant 
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complexity in tackling, especially from the international perspective (Clapp, 2001). So 
considering the misperceptions between the DMs would be another possible applicable 
future research topic. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the world would become more secure and 
peaceful if the hazardous waste problem could be solved at its root, the generation of 
toxic wastes, instead of fixing it after the occurrence.  The employment of some 
particular techniques to reduce the generation of toxic wastes and, maybe, even slow 
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